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Summary and Keywords
International norms exist as constraints on foreign policy, yet norms are also the product
of the foreign policies of states and other actors. Research has demonstrated how norms
restrain foreign policy choice and behavior, and even alter state conceptions of national
interests. Other studies point to the weakness of norms in the face of national interests
and state power. Others note that the meaning of norms and their obligations are often
contested, leading to problems of norm violation and norm enforcement. As social
constructions, an important consideration is how and when foreign policy promotes
norms and norm diffusion in the broader international community.
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Introduction
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) entails the exploration of the various influences that shape
decision-making in national governments. From the psychological dispositions of elites, to
the domestic and international systems in which they operate, how leaders make the
decisions they do is of enduring importance for scholars and citizens alike. The first
purpose of this article is to review the literature on the effects of international norms on
the foreign policy of states. Countless studies over decades from various theoretical
perspectives have taken up the issue of whether, when, and why states comply with
international norms. One way to know if norms matter is if states follow them, and
whether they are changed by prevailing social expectations.
Among the different types of norms in the literature, there are regulative norms that refer
to those that constrain behavior, a popular account for foreign policy analysis. Some
norms are prohibitive, saying what not to do, while others are prescriptive or permissive,
saying what can be or should be done (Finnemore, 1996). Constitutive norms go beyond
mere constraint to change or “create new actors, interests, or categories of
action” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Searle, 1995). There are norms tied to particular
identity groups, and others that exist more generally. Norms are bundled in broader
international regimes and institutions, and some “metanorms” provide “foundational” and
constitutional architecture to more specific rules and laws (Reus-Smit, 1997).
One argument for norm conformity and acceptance is the implied punishment that comes
with noncompliance. Some definitions of norms stress the aspect of social sanction for
normatively proscribed behaviors. A “behavioral definition” of norms, according to
Axelrod (1986, p. 1097), “exists to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way
and are often punished when seen not to be acting this way.” But a focus on “behavioral
regularities” risks tautology and ignores that possibility that “not all patterned behavior
is rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations about others’ behaviors” (Helmke &
Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). To be a norm, Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p. 272) argue that a
behavioral regularity must “respond to an established rule or guideline, the violation of
which generates some kind of external sanction.” The definitions provided by Axelrod,
Helmke, and Levitsky assume punishment of norm violators, which may not be
theoretically or empirically warranted. A second section of this article takes up the
foreign policy of norm enforcement or punishment of norm violations.
Among the most common definition of norms in the international relations literature is
“collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given
identity” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5). With this definition, we face the problem of figuring out
who has the “given identity” and how shared the collective expectations are for which
appropriate behaviors. This sociological approach tends to take for granted the clarity of
normative prescriptions and prohibitions—that they are “shared to at least a minimal
degree” (Copeland, 2000, p. 194). A third aspect of our article takes up the matter of how
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shared norms are, and how successfully socialization diffuses norms throughout
international society, and how much those norms are contested. If they are contested or
subject to different interpretations, the strength of norms will remain in doubt.
There are various theoretical perspectives on norms, and various degrees of optimism
and pessimism about their role. The assumption that norms are “good,” and have
powerful influences, leads to research trying to show how good norms can replace bad,
and how such good norms gain acceptance and compliance. Neoliberal and conventional
constructivist perspectives tend to operate in this space. Realists and critical theorists,
rather, frame norms as products of power. For realists, the lurking power behind norms is
power politics, with norms epiphenomena of the power and interests of major states in
the system. For critical constructivists, various forms of social and economic hegemony
lie behind norms, which are products of power meant to impose one’s will and control
others. Such norms are to be challenged, denaturalized, and deconstructed. From these
myriad perspectives, with concomitant epistemological and ontological differences, it is
hard to assess the cumulative findings of norms research definitively. The literature is
hampered by a lack of generalizable studies; lack of clear and agreed definitions; and
thus the lack of cumulative, refined theoretical and empirical knowledge (Desch, 1998, pp.
151–152), but the pluralism of approaches brings diversity to the puzzle of norms. While
there are different perspectives and varying evidence on the impact of norms, they
remain a central part of modern foreign policy analysis.
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Norm Conformity and Violation
A great bulk of norms research is devoted to the fundamental question of state
compliance with, and violation of, “shared expectations of appropriate behavior.” One
reason to maintain a distinction between normative belief and normative practice is to
examine when and how often they coincide. For example, Evangelista (2014, p. 11) notes
that “leaders acknowledged that continuing hold of normative beliefs about avoiding
civilian harm” after World War II but “the norm—the dominant practice—of strategic
bombing of cities rendered that goal unachievable.”
Hirata (2008, p. 239) summarizes the conditions affecting compliance with norms,
including the international or domestic power structure in which norm politics
takes place; Material interests of policymakers; Transnational socialization of
policymakers; and a Positive match (or congruence) between an international
norm and domestic culture. This catalog of factors suggests various rationalist and
cultural perspectives on norm conformity.
Realist and neoliberal institutional perspectives have approached norms through
rationalist models of cost and benefit to state interests. Realists tend to view norms as
“geopolitically constructed,” reflecting “the broad interests of powerful states” (Thomas,
2001,

p. 31). Realists maintain that the following international norms are a matter of

national interest, to be selfishly disregarded at by those with the power and interest to do
so. Realists are largely unconvinced about the independent power of norms to compel
behavior in the face of power asymmetries and the “absence of mechanisms” and
authoritative institutions for determining how to behave (Krasner, 1999, pp. 3–6). Other
realists are unconvinced about the ability of norms to overcome issues of uncertainty and
relative gains (Copeland, 2000; Mearsheimer, 1994/1995). Neoliberal institutionalists afford
norms greater attention through a rationalist lens in which they served to coordinate
states’ interest maximization. The functional nature of norms is meant to overcome
problems of uncertainty, allowing states to cooperate and build trust for mutual gain.
From the perspective of regimes and institutions, norms constrain states largely by
altering incentive structures for cooperation (Axelrod, 1986; Reus-Smit, 1997, p. 560).
While interests and power no doubt influence the record of norm compliance,
constructivists have sought to theorize and empirically demonstrate the social power of
norms to constrain even Great Powers. While coercive power may have a role in “being
heard and having the opportunity to persuade,” Finnemore (2003, pp. 88–90, 143–145)
questions the assumption that “material conditions impose a necessary behavioral logic”
on normative choices. Studies have shown how even Great Powers have been constrained
and even changed by norms. Bower (2015, p. 349) argues that, even without the United
States “and other emerging global leaders like China, India, and Russia,” such as the ban
on antipersonnel mines, treaties “generate informal compliance and adaptation among
non-party states even as these actors remain outside the formal legal agreement.”
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Beyond constraining behavior, Bjorkdahl (2002, p. 11) adds that the constructivist
literature offers “a theoretical explanation of interest (re)-formation.” Klotz’s (1995)
landmark study demonstrates the anti-apartheid cause as a “coercive and socializing
force in its own right,” showing the “moral principle of racial equality influenced policy
on a different, often conflicting, level from economic and strategic factors” (Gerhart, 1997).
For constructivists, the constitutive force of norms is in biasing choice or reducing
choices to the level of unthinkable (internalized taboo) or unconscious habit (Abdelal et
al., 2006, pp. 697–698).
Two examples of normative constraints in the security realm are the nuclear proliferation
regime and the nuclear taboo. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is among the
most widely shared institutions in contemporary world politics, yet puzzles remain about
who develops and who foregoes nuclear weapons programs in both an anarchical and
normative environment. Sagan (1996/1997, p. 76) elaborates a norms model of proliferation
that hypothesizes that nuclear weapons acquisition has gone from a “prestigious” pursuit
to an effort that is “illegitimate and irresponsible” under the norms of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty. The nuclear taboo is a popular example of the power and problems of
norms on states, including Great Powers. Tannenwald has argued that the United States
has been constrained for decades, even at the risk of national interests, due to social and
domestic pressures of the moral prohibition against nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 1999).
The record on the nuclear taboo’s power, however, has been challenged by recent studies
questioning if the taboo is so strong or absolute (Dolan, 2013; Press, Sagan, & Valentino,
2013).

Press and colleagues (2013) find evidence to suggest the American public has “only a

weak aversion to using nuclear weapons,” and a willingness to use nuclear weapons when
nuclear weapons provide advantages over conventional weapons in destroying critical
targets (Press et al., 2013, p. 1). Tannenwald (2005) finds that decisions to violate the
nuclear taboo depends on the extent to which the perception of a normative conflict is
shared by other decision-makers and society more generally.
Even if leaders have internalized a norm willingly in the abstract, the complexity of realworld events create sometime a gray area about when norms apply, or when multiple
norms conflict. Barkin (2003, p. 337) notes that “even if all actors in the international
system … accept the same basic set of normative structures, they will differ in their
interpretation of those structures, whether for rationally self-interested reasons or for
psychological (ones).” This leaves open the question of on what basis will interpretations
match or diverge. Because of social and ego costs of being perceived in violation of rules,
leaders who seem to violate fuzzy norms can offer accounts to argue that the act in fact is
not a violation, or that it is an exception (Adler-Nissen, 2014; Shannon, 2000).
For all the attention to norms, culture, and identity in international relations, Hudson and
Sampson (1999, p. 670) observe a remarkable lack of “interest in what psychology has to
say about those subjects,” despite being long-standing subjects of well-developed
research in the field. This has led some to call for an “ideational alliance” between
psychology and constructivism, to complement each other’s shortcomings and provide a
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fuller view of ideational effects in the policy realm (Shannon & Kowert, 2012).
Psychological approaches take norms seriously, yet remind us that “international actors
are bombarded with large numbers of normative messages, many of them conflicting,
from both external and domestic sources” (Rublee, 2008, p. 426) that are triggered by
different situational contexts and which need to be interpreted through agents with
different perceptions. Goertz (2004, p. 16) posits the model of “decision making under
constraints” as the interaction “between a decision maker and her or his normative
environment.” The model’s first step includes eliminating alternative policy options that
are “unacceptable on key dimensions,” beyond mere expected utility (Goertz, 2004, pp. 14–
15). Similarly, Houghton’s (2012) analysis of the Iranian Hostage Crisis applies a two-step
analysis of choice, starting with similar normative elimination of options, followed by a
rational choice of remaining alternatives. Working from a psychological standpoint,
Hymans (2006) argues that domestic elite role identities shape decisions about weapons
programs, with “oppositional nationalists” distrusting and unconcerned with the
international arena. Rublee (2008, p. 425) deploys social psychology to explain nuclear
restrain as the result of social conformity as well as identification—“behavior resulting
from the desire or habit of following the actions of an important other.”
Other psychological studies find that some leaders have personality traits demonstrating
a lack of concern for social acceptance or social constraints, let alone international ones.
One study of multiple cases of intervention decision-making concluded “in none of the
five cases did I discern a significant concern among top decisionmakers with the
implications of international norms and laws when they made their decisions to
intervene,” concluding that “decisionmakers pay much more attention to the law of the
land than to the law of nations” (Vertzberger, 1998, pp. 402–403). If norms are
environmental constraints, knowing if leaders are “constraint respecters” or
“challengers” becomes a plausible variable in the enactment of international norms
(Keller, 2005). Distrustful or nationalistic leaders may entertain different policy options
that others call “unthinkable.” Shannon and Keller (2007) show that in the Bush
administration debate about the Iraq War, officials high in “distrust” levels supported
unilateral attack without UN authorization more than those lower on that leadership trait.
U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump publicly entertained resuming torture, to some
fanfare in his political base (Johnson, 2016).
As can be shown, norms, power, interests, and psychology complicate easy conclusions
about the power of norms in the foreign policy process. Whereas rationalist wisdom
suggests states on narrow and material self-interest calculations, and constructivists
suggest the logic of appropriateness, these two positions are not mutually exclusive.
Socially appropriate choices can make strategic sense, and rational choices can be
socially constrained or filtered (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Shannon, 2000). Monroe (2001,
p. 159) argues that self-interest is “balanced by human needs for sociability, defined as a
feeling of belonging to a group or collectivity.”
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If norms are social expectations of appropriateness, states have to learn about
appropriateness through socialization, and part of socialization is argued to come through
punishment for transgressions. If norm enforcement is inconsistent, the socialization
process will suffer as well. Among those chiefly positioned to enforce norms and punish
violators, are states. Enforcement, then, becomes a foreign policy choice. We turn to the
topics of norm enforcement and socialization in the following sections.

Norm Enforcement
Whether and how states enforce a norm is a key area of research. Some highlight the role
of the powerful in assisting in norm promotion (Voeten, 2014, p. 303). Great Powers are
arguably best positioned to enforce international norms against violations with any
credibility, either through direct coercion or political power through international
institutions (DeNevers, 2007). This suggests that some norms fulfill a “power-maintenance
function” in normatively prohibiting actions or developments in the system that the
powerful see as a challenge to their positions (Thomas, 2001, p. 32). To the extent that
Great Powers matter, knowing when major powers will enforce norms and punish
violators is of special importance. Ever since the League of Nations failed to save
Manchuria and Abyssinia from encroachment, realists have stressed the folly of assuming
self-interested states will rescue others in the name of international principles and
obligations. Herrmann and Shannon (2001) surveyed U.S. elites’ response to experimental
conditions affecting willingness to “defend international norms,” and found that
willingness to enforce norms varied greatly by perceptions, interests, and other
situational factors.
Barnett (2011, p. 19) poses two questions in the name of enforcing norms: (1) whether it is
a permissive or compulsory responsibility, and (2) “who has duties to whom.” A third
enforcement question is how to do it, especially, since some forms of punishment
themselves may violate norms. Enforcement can take many forms. Pattison (2015) argues
that states have a “moral duty to criticize” perpetrators of “mass atrocities and serious
external aggression,” leaving of course questions of whether this happens empirically to
others. It also suggests the conundrum of determining the slippery notion of what
constitutes “mass” atrocities and “serious” aggression (Shannon, 2005).
To enforce norms, or punish violators, Carpenter (2013) said “the appropriate course of
action would be to, first, independently verify who violated it.” The United States vowed
“no doubt” that Syria was responsible for the 2013 chemical attack, but who decides and
how remains the problem of international order. The second issue is to consider who
responds and how, which becomes a matter of debate. On the “Red Line crisis” in Syria,
the Obama administration for a time “made norm-enforcement the primary, professed
basis for attacking Syria,” but Zenko (2013) notes that norms became an argument against
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intervention, such as Senator Ted Cruz’s claim that “I don’t think that’s the job of our
military, to be defending amorphous international norms.”
Humanitarian Intervention is a form of norm enforcement, but the norms surrounding
expectations of the international community are far from clear and developed. Finnemore
(1996) traces the evolution of humanitarian intervention to stress multilateralism and to
encompass more of humanity, but still considers it a permissive (not compulsory) norm.
Western’s (2002) study of humanitarian decisions in Somalia and Bosnia shows competing
beliefs about obligation and interests in 1992, with decisions to act resulting from
growing public and administration pressures to “do something.”
Humanitarian intervention is complicated because it merges human rights norms with
issues about the legitimate use of force. The classic paradigm of sovereignty is challenged
by the more recent notion of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). A recent international
set of principles about the need to respond to mass atrocities when a home government is
unable or unwilling, debate about the efficacy of humanitarian intervention goes from the
optimistic (Glanville, 2015) to the pessimistic (Hehir, 2010). Shannon (2005) points to the
differing views of legitimate meaning of humanitarian crises and how to respond to them
in the Balkans. Barnett (2011, p. 12) reminds us that “any act of intervention, no matter
how well intended, is also an act of control” and thus can arouses suspicion by those who
distrust the motives of the interveners.
Sociological and social-psychological perspectives also acknowledge the tendency for
inconsistency in enforcing norms, related to prior judgment of the violator and violation.
It is often assumed that the violation has occurred, and states merely debate and decide
how to enforce and punish. But judgment of an act as violation is itself variable, such as
diverging Russian and American perceptions of Balkan atrocities and the legitimacy of
NATO responses in the 1990s (Shannon, 2005). Herrmann and Shannon’s (2001)
experimental survey of American elites show that the same, allegedly norm-violating act
generated different responses from U.S. elites depending on who did it. Those with
positive images of Israel were more forgiving than those with negative images of Israel,
for example, not to mention the same act committed by Iran. But perspectives premised
on needs for positive social and self-esteem also can explain motivations that cause states
to act. Barnett (2011, pp. 26–28) observes that “ethical awakenings are produced by a
crisis of faith and a process of atonement” in which a “horrific event” “demands a
response” so that we continue to “tell ourselves … that we are good, loving individuals.”
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Socializing States? Norm Diffusion and
Contestation
The norm life cycle suggested by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argues that norms emerge
and spread over time, and with it comes more compliance and internalization of the norm.
This leads to a final question of the politics of norm diffusion and the process of
contesting or accepting new norms from the international system. Two factors that Legro
(1997, pp. 42, 45–52) tied to compliance relate to how shared a norm is (concordance) and,
how clearly codified is it (specificity)? On the matter of concordance, conventional
wisdom that the more people who support a norm, the more likely it is to be followed; the
fewer who abide by a norm, the less likely violators are to be punished, which permits
further violations (Axelrod, 1986). How and when states adopt norms in the first place
becomes of vital importance to those seeking to spread norms. Even widely held norms in
the system are “hegemonic, not totalizing,” meaning that norms still may be contested
(Reus-Smit, 1997, pp. 567–568).
Domestically oriented constructivists recognize that different notions of “appropriate or
desirable political ends” and means sometimes “come from inside states” (the “internal
locus of causation”) and sometimes come “from changes in the social rules constructed
among states in dealings with one another” (Finnemore, 2003, pp. 93–94). The problem of
concordance and the presumed cultural uniformity and consensus at the international
level is challenged by domestic differences in social expectations and values. If foreign
policy is partly about domestic politics, norm concordance within societies is another
question for consideration to explain norm compliance. Rousseau (2006, p. 12) refers to
this as a “fractional view of norms,” highlighting that norms are rarely 100% accepted,
and proponents of certain norms “often compete vigorously with proponents of alternate
beliefs and values for hegemony within a society.” Rousseau acknowledges the norm life
cycle model but notes “there are no absolute thresholds” for defining when norms are
strong, weak, or “dead.”
Checkel’s (1999) concept of cultural match between domestic and international norms
suggests the myriad possibilities of assessing and accepting global norms. These insights
show that disjoint in international and domestic norms yields a pluralistic patchwork of
normative structures and behavior rather than a universal consensus over right and
wrong. Domestic cultural variability opens possibilities for norm entrepreneurship and
violation, thus the need to account for understanding how foreign policy elites negotiate
the social and political world that shapes them. Different domestic structures are more
amenable to the influence of outside transnational networks of influence (Checkel, 1999;
Risse, 2016).
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If different states internalize different norms, which themselves are at different degrees
of strength and clarity, it is hard to assess the power of norms on policy or the power of
policy on norms. Norm diffusion matters in that norms are said to “matter” the more they
are adopted by others. In the study of “how ideas spread” (Acharya, 2004), dynamics of
socialization to help “teach” states about proper behavior and roles (Thies, 2013), run up
against perspectives focusing on the socializees and “norm takers.” States can be
entrepreneurs, or “norm makers” pushing for changes, or “norm takers” under social
pressures from “above” and “below” (Checkel, 1999; Wunderlich, 2013, p. 33). Lantis (2011)
shows elites pushing new norms by challenging the legitimacy or meaning of existing
ones (Wunderlich, 2013, pp. 33–34). Giraldi (2012) examines policy diffusion as the “spread
of specific instruments, standards, and institutions, both public and private, to broad
policy models, ideational frameworks,” while others see norms “diffused via mimicry,
professionalization, and coercive isomorphism” (Kim & Sharman, 2014, p. 424).
States as “norm takers” are lobbied and pressured by others to adopt new norms or
comply with existing ones, leading to the question of when states in fact change. “Newadopter” states sometimes take on new norms out of dependency on international
resources, or to improve legitimacy in the international community (Ayoub, 2015). In line
with realist theories, “extrinsic events” that “upset the existing international order” may
“render normative commitments obsolete” (Wunderlich, 2013, p. 30). Raymond (1997)
demonstrates that the power of the norm of neutrality varies based on structural changes
in the balance of power.
States adopt norms for reasons other than clear material interests, or despite them.
Scientific and technological innovations are another cited factor for change, such as the
professional communities fostering new views on appropriate organ trafficking (Efrat,
2015).

One path to inculcating new norms is to build on previous norms. Price’s (1995)

“genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo” built on other existing norms to frame
specific prohibitions based on precedent or as part of a broader norm such as civilian
protection. Linde (2014) argues that the enshrinement of children as rights holders
“mirrors international consolidation of authority over human rights in general after World
War II, as the international community increasingly became the arbiter of acceptable
treatment of citizens by states.” Human Rights INGO’s empower pro-abolition
constituencies and influence governments by lobbying and framing capital punishment as
a human rights violation. Kim (2015) analyzes 158 states from 1967–2010, controlling for
regime type and regional demonstration effects, finds an important role for “local
engagement” in leading to “complete abolition” of the death penalty.
The assumption that shaming, persuasion, and socialization will bring states in line with
new norms is not foreordained. Within constructivism, there is great variety in the
notions of norms and logics at work in politics. Wunderlich’s (2013, p. 24) review
distinguishes between first-wave norm studies and second-wave, the former being “stuck
to a structuralist perspective” by treating norms “as stable and constant phenomena.”
Second-wave studies problematize norms as both “structuring and socially constructed
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through interaction in a context,” focusing on contestation of their meaning (Wiener, 2004;
Wunderlich, 2013, p. 26). Employing and analyzing surveys of permanent commission
officials in 1996 and 2002, Hooghe (2005) demonstrates that, while support for
supranational norms is high, the support comes from prior, national experiences and
party loyalty. With norms and foreign policy analysis, all politics may be local.
Knowing state and elite identities and roles, then, may be important determinants of their
perceptions of the legitimacy of existing normative structures. Checkel’s (1999) cultural
match concept illustrated the role of existing domestic norms have on adopting new
international norms. Acharya (2004) adds dynamism to the process, replacing a static
“cultural match” with “congruence building,” and highlighting the process of
“localization” to the efforts of spreading new norms in new places. Saunders (2006) argues
that powerful states act as “norm entrepreneurs” and also set “membership criteria” for
international society, despite the “bounded intersubjectivity” of limited agreement over
norms and the “criteria.” Muller and Wunderlich suggest an array of international actors,
from “Great Powers” to “good citizen” states to “revolutionary.” Thies (2013, pp. 21–22)
uses role theory to distinguish states along dimensions of their degree of structural
conditioning and degree of conformity within the system, arguing that some states are
successfully socialized into the “club of nations,” while others—“rogue states” and “quasistates”—are not. Notions of “good citizen” states, “rogue” states, and the like, can be
helpful if carefully done so as not to essentialize and politicize the labeling of states.
Some critical constructivists point to a Western bias in theory and practice of
socialization. Zarakol (2014, p. 312) argues that modern international society was built on
a dynamic of stigmatization of non-Westerners, and Steinhilper (2015) argues that the
“mainstream diffusion literature has mostly focused on the proliferation of liberal
Western norms, radiating from “the West” to “the Rest.” Skeptics of the presumed
goodness of norms and international society is Epstein (2012), who argues that
socialization has “the effect of ‘infantilizing’ the socializee,” leading to silencing, she
argues, which stretches into the scholarly research realm itself. Some see marginalized
groups adapting and succeeding in the system nonetheless. Steinhilper (2015) finds that
Indigenous peoples, in alliance with transnational advocacy networks and sympathetic
states, have succeeded in constructing a new HR norm manifested in the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People (RIP). Another skeptic of the virtuous power of
international norms, Xuetong (2011) doubts that “international interactions can only
advance international norms towards a Kantian culture of friendly mutual help” as
opposed to “regression to a Hobbesian culture of hostile confrontation”—citing the six
party talks and normative pressure leading not to norm acceptance but accelerated
nuclear testing. Some studies point to the political benefits of outright defiance of
international norms. Prakash and Ilgit (2017) show that international criticism can be a
catalyst for states’ leaders to “consolidate state identity” against negative
representations.
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Of course, resistance is easier said than done, and for some countries easier than others.
Adler-Nissen (2014), analyzing the stigmatization of “transgressive” states, and how actors
within stigmatized states cope, finds that “low-ranking agents are … negatively affected
by their stigmatization, but not so socialized that they lack the agency to strive for
change” and resistance. Some see actors as having less ability to resist socialization to
their position, such as non-Western states seeking to “move up rank” as defeated excolonial power fighting stigmatization in a largely Western order (Mattern & Zarakol, 2016,
pp. 17–18).
The dichotomous notion of norm compliance or violation has been supplanted by studies
of social and strategic adaptation to normative environments. Much research explores
strategies for social resistance and evasion of contested norms. Those under pressure to
conform to norms have creative choices beyond compliance and violation. One option is
to give rhetorical “lip service” to norms while trying to avoid the obligations. Thomas
(2002) notes that such lip service can trap states through a “boomerang effect” by which
networks of non-state actors influence states when they identify with international norms
that the states have formally accepted—“even if that formal acceptance did not initially
reflect any serious intention to implement or monitor the norm in question.” Dixon (2017)
proposes a taxonomy of rhetorical resistance to norms in the face of social pressure,
including norm interpretation, norm avoidance, and norm signaling. Buzas (2015) explores
evasion and the exploitation of legal loopholes, arguing by example that France evaded
the norm of racial equality to expel the Roma with impunity by technically complying with
the international legislation on racial equality as it pertains to the freedom of movement.”

Conclusion
In summary, norms have clearly entered decision-maker thinking, but whether they are
decisive seems to vary widely on power, interests, personality, and other variables.
Further studies can start to turn these lists of conditions into testable theories to advance
a generalizable understanding of how norms can matter.
One of the problems with norms research is the epistemological divides that, while
promoting pluralism of theory and method, also inhibit cumulative research premised on
hypothesis testing. There are countless “case studies” of the role of specific norms in
specific instances, but rarely do they invoke case study methodology that maximizes
virtues of control and variation of the values of variables of interest. Bjorkdahl (2002, p.
11) laments the difficulties in tracking the causal effect of ideas and norms, noting that
postmodernists and post-structuralists “have abandoned the search for causes and
objective truths.” This article shows the diversity of a pluralistic field in terms of theory
and method. Cumulative findings are difficult to come by if the bulk of the research is
idiosyncratic cases or self-consciously eschewing research design that can facilitate
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generalizable theory building. But ultimately, nothing is stopping neo-positivist attempts
to do so. Goertz and Diehl (1992) laid out guidelines for doing norms research in a
positivist vein of testable, measurable dynamics.
Head-to-head theory testing is not vital, of course, and many advocate theory building
and synthesis across paradigms. Many meta-debates in the field of IR call for moving
toward synthesis, cross-pollination, and integrative theory building. Examples in the
norms field include “realist constructivism” (Barkin, 2003; Sterling-Folker, 2002) to
“psychological constructivism” (Hymans, 2010; Shannon & Kowert, 2012). General theories
are also not essential, and “middle range” theories of country-specific behavior or
clusters of “state types” has been potentially illuminating. But the effort to generalize and
clarify patterns of normative behavior must continue to keep norms at the center of
academic and policy debates.
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